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INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INNOVATION IN CHINA
DROITS DE PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE ET INNOVATION EN CHINE
Blandine LAPERCHE
Résumé : La progression du marché en Chine depuis la politique d’ouverture menée par
Deng Xiaoping est allée de pair avec la définition de règles et de lois visant à encadrer
l’activité  de  création  scientifique  et  technique,  c'est-à-dire  de  règles  de  respect  de  la
propriété intellectuelle. Les années 1980 et 1990 ont été celles du rattrapage en matière
de propriété intellectuelle, dans la mesure où ce pays s’est doté d’un cadre juridique
comparable  à  celui  des  pays  industriels  en  adoptant  l’ensemble  des  accords
internationaux  signés  dans  ce  domaine.    Notre  objectif  est  de  mettre  au  jour  les
conséquences  de  l’adoption  de  ce  cadre  juridique.  En  particulier,  quels  en  sont  les
impacts sur l’innovation chinoise ? Est-ce un moyen de favoriser l’investissement local et
donc de stimuler l’innovation « endogène » ? Ou bien le respect des règles internationales
en  matière  de  propriété  intellectuelle  et  plus  particulièrement  industrielle  (nous  nous
centrons ici principalement sur le rôle des brevets) a-t-il pour conséquence première de
favoriser l’investissement international en Chine ? Nous soulignons dans ce document
l’intérêt  que  constitue  une  approche  systémique  du  processus  d’innovation.  Celle-ci
découle non pas de la prise en compte d’un seul paramètre - si important soit-il (par
exemple le cadre légal de la propriété intellectuelle) - pour expliquer les résultats en
termes  d’innovation,  mais  de  l’ensemble  du  fonctionnement  du  système  national
d’innovation y compris, dans un contexte de globalisation, ses relations avec les autres
systèmes nationaux d’innovation.
Abstract: The market-oriented policy implemented by Deng Xiaoping since the end of
the 1970s has led to the determination of laws ruling scientific and technical creation, i.e
intellectual  property  rules.  During  the  1980s  and  1990s,  China  developed  a  legal
framework of intellectual property (IP) meeting international standards. Our aim in this
paper is to discuss the consequences of the implementation of this legal framework. In
particular, what are the impacts on Chinese innovation? Is it, as expected by the Chinese
government but also as often stressed in the literature on innovation, a way to boost
domestic  investment  and  hence  endogenous  innovation?  Or  is  the  implementation  of
these international rules favouring first and foremost foreign investment in China, as also
expected  by  the  Chinese  government?  This  paper  supports  the  idea  of  the  role  of  a
systemic approach to the innovation process as well as the weakness of a too simplistic
approach that would consist in linking the IP legal framework to the results in terms of
innovation.
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« The Emergence of China as a Leading Nation in Science » is the title of a paper published
in 2006 in Research Policy (Zhou, Leydesdorff, 2006). According to the authors, China is
ahead  of  Europe  in  the  building  of  a  knowledge-based  economy,  and  in  the  field  of
nanotechnologies it is just behind the USA. However, the term of « emergence » could be
questioned. As a matter of fact, in the fields of science and techniques, China was for a long
time far ahead of Europe. In addition to China’s three big inventions – printing, gunpowder
and  the  magnetic  compass  –  others  such  as  the  mechanical  clock,  cast-iron,  stirrups  and
harness, the universal joint suspension, the Pascal triangle and quantitative cartography are of
Chinese origin and rest on a deep knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, physics, geography
as  well  as  biology.  However,  it  was  Europe  that  saw  the  birth  of  “modern  science”
(application  of  mathematical  hypotheses  to  nature,  experimental  method).  According  to
Joseph Needham’s (1973) thesis, the development of modern science in Europe is not the
result  of  a  lack  of  systematisation  or  theoretisation  of  Chinese  science  but  stems  from  a
missing  or  weakly  developed  element  –  compared  to  the  innovation  systems  that  were
implemented in many European countries of the Renaissance: the market.
Chinese science has long been organised in a bureaucratic form, under State control: the
scientist is a civil servant, the engineer and the craftsman alike are part of the bureaucracy. In
this social organisation, the merchant is not in high favour. On the contrary, when commercial
capitalism appeared in the European Renaissance, the merchant gained access to political
power. This facilitated a close contact between science and market. This connection between
scientific and technical knowledge and market explains the birth of modern science, used as a
production force in Europe. Then, keeping in mind that the history of China has long been
characterised by periods of opening and closure to the markets of industrial countries (Zhang,
Krug, Reinmoller, 2005), and flying over the history of the country, we could consider that
the irruption of the market into the functioning of Chinese society by 1978 onwards is an
explanatory factor of this emergence of China as a great scientific and technical nation.
Deng Xiaoping’s implementation of an opening policy and the subsequent progression of the
market in China has also been characterised by the determination of rules and laws aimed at
framing the activity of scientific and technical creation, i.e. intellectual property (IP) rules. In
this contribution, we will particularly focus on this aspect of modern science and technology
in China. The 1980s and 1990s were catching up decades in the field of intellectual property
rights, as the country implemented a legal framework comparable with the one of industrial
countries, adopting all the international agreements signed in this field (2).  Our objective is to
study the consequences of the adoption of this legal framework. In particular, what are the
impacts on innovation in China? Has it been a way to boost local investment and thus to
stimulate « endogenous » innovation (3)? Or, is the first consequence of the compliance with
international rules in the field of industrial property (we especially focus here on the role of
patents) to boost international investment in China (4)?
                                                          
1 The author would like to thank Liu Zhan (Master’s degree student at ULCO) for his bibliographical research.5
1. The Adaptation of China to International Rules of Intellectual Property Protection
1.1. A legal framework meeting international standards
The coming of Deng Xiaoping to power in 1978 marked the building of a modern system of
protection of industrial property. This was essential to the policy of opening and attraction of
foreign investment to China as from this date. Many disputes and disagreements on the topic
of intellectual property characterised the relations between China and industrial countries –
and especially the USA – during the 1980s and 1990s and contributed to the determination
and the improvement of intellectual property rules (La Croix, Konan, 2002). After becoming a
member of the the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1980, the Chinese
government promulgated national laws on patents, trademarks and copyrights (table 1), and
progressively  ratified  all  international  treaties  and  conventions  (table  2).  The  Chinese
Parliament adopted general principles of Civil Law which came into force in 1987 and which
contained a first clear definition of intellectual property rights.
The trade-related intellectual property agreement (TRIPS) was the last agreement signed by
China, and jointly managed by WTO and WIPO. This agreement, implemented in 1995, is
considered as the most advanced one in terms of harmonisation of IP rights worldwide, as it
includes minimum rules which have to be complied with by all signatory countries. These
countries must also respect the clauses of “National Treatment” (each member-state shall not
treat the citizens of other member-states less favourably than its own citizens) and of the
“Most Favoured Nation” (any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a member-
state to the citizens of a member-state shall be granted immediately and unconditionally to the
citizens of all other member-states). Trade sanctions are provided for when a country does not
respect these clauses (Ilardi, 2002). We can notably note that to join WTO (2001), one of the
clauses imposed on China was to define, improve and comply with international standards in
terms of IP rights.
Table 1: Main Chinese Laws in the field of Intellectual Property
Main Chinese














Includes product and services marks. Registration is
valid for 10 years after approval, with a 10 year
renewal option
Patent Law of the
People's Republic
of China
March 12, 1984 
(reviewed in
1992 and 2000)
All types of technological inventions are patentable.
Patents can be granted on inventions, utility models
and industrial design
validity: 20 years for inventions, 10 years for utility








validity: no deadline for authors’ rights,
modification rights and author’s integrity. The
publication right and the main other rights are valid
50 years after the author’s death.
Sources : http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg/default.htm (English version) ; OCDE
(2004)6
Table 2: International Treaties, Conventions and Agreements signed by China
International Treaties,  conventions and agreements Year
Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual  Property  Organisation  and  a
Contracting Country of WIPO
1980
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1985
Treaty on IP Respect of Integrated Circuits (signatory country) 1989
Madrid agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks 1989
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1992
Geneva  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Producers  of  Phonograms  against
Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms
1992
Universal Copyright Convention 1992
Patent Cooperation Treaty 1993
Budapest  Treaty  on  the  International  Recognition  of  the  Deposit  of  Micro-
organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure
1993
TRIPS 2001
Source : Yang D., Clarke P., 2005, p. 550
1.2. A legal framework which is still embryonic
Within 20 years, China has adopted a legal framework of IP rights comparable with the one of
industrial  countries  and  meeting  WIPO  standards.  National,  regional  administrative  and
departmental regulations are added to these laws and aim at specifying the enforcement of IP
laws and at imposing heavier penalties on counterfeiting. China has also developed training
programs and public awareness campaigns on the subject of IP.
However, the legal framework of intellectual property has some distinguishing features from
that of many other countries (Yang and Clarke, 2005, pp.547, 548):
- The Chinese legal framework has been developed concurrently with the formation of
businesses. Therefore, it is very new and very different from other legal systems existing
in developed countries, which are much older (only in the field of new tehnologies is the
situation similar, but it is a very small part of this legal framework);
- Because  of  the  fast  implementation  of  this  legal  framework,  many  articles  of  the
different  component  laws  are  open  to  interpretation.  Laws  and  regulations  issued  by
several governenment bodies make it very complex;
- The translation from Chinese to English (and the related ambiguities) also complicates
the legal framework of IP;
- The  relations  between the  legal  system  and  the  administration  are  very  important,
which may reduce the authority of the courts.
Finally, the main limit lays in the difficult implementation of the IP legal framework. In other
words, if laws exist, their implementation is far more nebulous.
The impact of the constitution of a modern IP legal framework on the Chinese economy is
according to us an interesting issue to raise. In particular, the main traditional argument to
justify the implementation of IP rules is the one of incentives (Scotchmer, 2004). The whole
economics of innovation, in particular since the works of Schumpeter (see Laperche, 2004a),
is based on these incentives. In the field of invention, without a temporary monopoly not a
single investor would invest in the design and dissemination of their invention. The risk of
opportunist behaviour (free-rider) leading to lower-cost duplication would be too high. In a
merchant economy, in the absence of patents technical progress would slacken if not become7
non-existent,  as  everyone  would  adopt  a  wait-and-see  behaviour.  Therefore,  has  the
implementation of IP rules created enough incentives to stimulate innovation in China?
2. Is the legal framework of IP stimulating innovation in China? 
2.1. Differenciated innovation incentives
Since  the  beginning  of  the  1980s,  statistic  data  and  studies  on  the  evolution  of  patent
applications (a key indicator of the capacity to invent, notwithstanding its limits) have shown
a strong increase in patent applications, this increase being even stronger during the 1990s. It
is worth remaining that the term « patent » in China includes invention patents, utility models
and industrial design. Invention patents give a 20-year protection, and inventions must meet
the  three  criteria  of  novelty,  industrial  utility  and  non  obviousness.  The  invention  patent
indicates a high level of technology – compared to utility models which refer to the rights for
minor technological solutions or to industrial design which protect the shape – design - of
products.  In  order  to  understand  whether  the  legal  framework  of  IP  stimulates  or  not
innovation in China, it is important to study the relative shares of these different types of
patents.  Moreover,  it  is  useful  to  distinguish  between  the  origin  of  applications  (from
residents and non-residents).
According  to  WIPO  and  SIPO  (State  IP  Office  in  China),  there  was  a  boom  in  patent
applications  in  China  during  the  1990s.  Applications  from  residents  and  non-residents
accounted for 8,558 in 1985; they reached 51,747 in 2000 and 173,327 in 2005 (fig 1).
Over the whole period 1985-2005, residents accounted for 50.4% of invention patents against
49.6%  for  non-residents  (see  table  3  in  annex).  These  results  tend  to  confirm  the  idea
according  to  which  the  implementation  of  an  IP  legal  framework  stimulates  invention.
However,  if  we  focus  on  granted  patents,  during  the  period  1985-2005  non-residents
accounted for 63.4% of all patent granted and their share has tended to increase in the recent
period (table 4 in annex and fig. 2).






















































































Nb: Data do not exist for 1998 and 1990. Source: author, on the basis of WIPO and SIPO
data.
 http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/grantedbyoffice/source.html  1985—2002
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/gk/ndbg/2005NB/200605/P020060529505722702540.htm
2003—2005
So it seems that, in the field of invention, the implementation of an IP legal framework,
similar to the one of industrial countries, has given more incentives to foreign inventors than
to Chinese ones. How can we account for the substantial share of non-residents in the number
of patents granted in China? According to Yang and Clarke (2005) who, with data up to 2002,
obtained quite similar results, the substantial proportion of patents granted to non-residents
stems from the fact that foreign invention patents are of better quality and also from the better
adaptation of their technology to the Chinese market.
Concerning utility models, which require a lower technological level and are also less costly,
the dynamism of Chinese residents is perceptible from the beginning of the studied period,
while non-residents only account for a low percentage of all applications and grants for utility
models  (according  to  our  calculations,  residents  accounted  for  99.3%  of  utility  patent
applications and grants during the period 1985-2004; see table 3 and 4 in annex). Then we can
also stress that the Chinese IP legal system has resulted in China in incentives for a lower
level of inventive activity.
Studying the evolutions of the innovation system of China, X. Liu and S. White (2001) came
to a quite similar statement. One of the aspects of the evolution of the Chinese system of
innovation is the increase in the number of firms that have created research units. In 1998,
they accounted for 45% of the national R&D expenditure (about 43% for research institutions
and 10% for universities). Their place has also been reinforced in terms of results (number of
patent applications). Most  of  them,  however,  concern  industrial  design.  In  1996,  Chinese
enterprises acounted for 98% of industrial design (research institutions accounted for 2%, and
universities  0%),  68%  of  design  patents  (20%  for  research  institutions  and  12  %  for
universities) and 29% of invention patents (against about 38% for research institutions and
34% for universities). Hence, Chinese residents, and among them enterprises, are not at the
origin of the most significant innovations.
Some  big  groups  have  started  to  develop  on  the  international  scene  (DREE,  2004,  p.8) :
Petrochina, Sinopec and CNOOC in the oil sector, Baosteel in the steel-making industry,
Huawei and ZTE in telecommunication equipment, Lenovo in the computer industry, TCL,9
Kejian,  SVA,  Konka,  Changhong  for  mobile  phones  and  electronic  products,  Haier  and
Galanz for domestic household appliances, or Tsingtao in the brewery sector. However these
groups suffer from limitations: their size is limited (in 2004, 11 firms ranked among the first
500 global firms, two of them belonging to the industrial sector: Petrochina and Sinopec);
their R&D expenses are low (on average, the total R&D expense of the first 500 Chinese
enterprises is lower than 1% of their turnover, against more than 5% for the first 500 global
enterprises). Their trademarks are not well known abroad (except for Lenovo and Haier, for
example). They suffer from management and financing problems, etc.
Some  enterprises  rank  well  internationally.  According  to  UNCTAD  (2005,  p.120),  two
Chinese enterprises are part of the 20 ones having the highest R&D expenditures. They are
Petrochina (USD 263 million in 2003) and China Petroleum & Chemical (USD 161 million).
Concerning patent applications, according to WIPO (http://wipo.org), Huawei Technologies
Co ranks among the first 50 applicants for PCT patents in the world (rank 37
 with 249 patents
published  in  2005).  Since  the  beginning  of  2000,  China  has  also  ranked  among  the  first
countries using the international patent (PCT). The number of PCT applications was 784 in
2000 and reached 2,452 in 2005. Globally, however, China only accounted for 1.8% of the
total number of patent applications in 2005, against for instance 33.6% for the United States.
Its progression is nonetheless very strong. The number of patent applications from Chinese
enterprises in China is also on the increase in the most recent period, as shown by the results
of the first 10 patent applicants in China (national enterprises) (see table 3).
Table 3: First 10 Patent Applicants for National Patents in China, 2003-2005



















(LG  electronics  Tianjin  Appliances  Co
Ltd)
1,606 1 2,327 1 -
Huawei Technologies Co, Ltd 1,551 2 2,176 2 1,231
Hongfujin  Precision  Industry  (Shenzen)
Co Ltd
944 3 1,224 5 642
Chongqing Lifan Industrial (Group) Co 761 4 1,293 4 369
Foxconn (Kunshan) Computer Connector
Co.
527 5 - - 244
Sinopec Co. 500 6 565 7 -
Haier Group 477 7 - - 355
Au optronics Co. 414 8 - - 285
BenQ  Telecom  and  Informat  Tech  Co,
Ltd
411 9 416 10 266
Levono China 399 10 - - -
Hon hai Precision Industry Co - - 1,385 3 -
ZTE Co. - - 642 6 342
LGECH (China Holding Company) - - 513 8 627
LGESH (Shangai LG electronics Co Ltd) - - 448 9 -
QuingDao Kingsea Arts Products Co Ltd - - - - 244
Source: http://www.cdip.gov.cn. The figures include the three types of Chinese patents.
Notwithstanding the good results of some big Chinese groups, the abovementioned studies
and  figures  might  lead  us  to  consider  that  the  implementation  of  an  IP  legal  framework
meeting international standards has mostly favoured foreign inventors. However, it is also10
difficult to isolate the IP legal framework as the only justifying factor for Chinese dynamism
or stagnation in the field of innovation in China. As we know from the approach in terms of
National Innovation Systems (Freeman, 1987, Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 1993), the incentive to
technological  innovation  and  dissemination  is  dependent  on  a  set  of  factors  much  more
diversified than the sole IP legal framework, even if the latter has a major role. The functions
of the different types of institutions (States, Research institutes, Universities, Enterprises), the
sharing of tasks between them, the nature and the intensity of their links contribute as much to
it.
Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy has transformed the innovation system. But the policy led
by the People’s Republic of China founded in 1949 also aimed at developing and modernising
the Chinese industrial capacity. The policy of the Four Modernisations (agriculture, science
and techniques, industry and the military sector) was based on technology transfer from the
USSR, on the statistical management of its imitation (reverse engineering) and on its diffusion
throughout China. According to Liu and White (2001) few incentives existed for the players
of  the  innovation  system  to  improve  the  imported  technologies,  which  may  explain  the
relative backwardness of Chinese technology at the end of the 1970s (compared to South
Korea which had imitated American technologies but also developed an endogenous own
innovation potential). The opening to competition and the introduction of competition into the
Chinese society have deeply modified the organisation of its national innovation system. The
Chinese innovation system is in “transition”. Transition is taken in the sense of Lundvall,
Intarakumnerd, Vang (2006), that is a process where one constellation of institutions (related
to the production, diffusion and use of knowledge) is turning into a different constellation of
institutions : scientific and technological programs have been developed to catch up in the
most modern scientific and technological fields,  the criteria for evaluating players’ activity
are more based on economic performance, decisions are decentralised, the labour market is
liberalised, the legal framework based on the aknowledgement of private property is taking
shape, R&D expenses are increasing (from 0.3% of GDP in the mid-1990s to nearly 3% of
GDP  today),  many  industrial  technology  R&D  institutes  have  transformed  to  be  closely
associated with industrial production (see also Sigurdson, 2005) … All those changes create
as many incentives to the extension and the strengthening of links between the players of NIS
and to the dissemination of innovation. But the speed of change (notably in terms of IP, as we
mentioned in the first part), the financial constraints, the lack of technicians, the difficulty in
the  enforcement  of  very  recent  laws,  etc.,  result  in  a  endogenous  technical  innovation
intensity which is still weak in the Chinese society.
Other studies specifically put forward the links between foreign investment and innovation,
without  under-estimating  the  other  factors  of  innovation,  notably  such  inputs  as  R&D
expenditures, scientific and technical staff, and economic (international trade, GNP level) and
institutional (notably the IP rules) environment.  This is the case with Cheung and Lin’s study
(2004)  which  aims  at  assessing  the  consequences  of  the  increase  in  foreign  investment
inflows on innovation (assessed by the number of patent applications) during the period 1995-
2000 and uses provincial data. According to the authors, foreign direct investment inflows
may have several effects on innovation: first, local firms may copy technologies and then
improve them and develop new products. A second type of spin-off ensuing from foreign
investment consists in the access of local firms to skilled human resources thanks to turnover
(the  employees  of  multinational  firms  are  then  employed  in  local  firms).  Finally,  foreign
direct investment may create « demonstration effects ». The presence of foreign products may
generate copies or imitation of products and processes. According to the authors’ study, there
is a strong correlation between the increase in foreign direct investment and invention in11
China (as measured by patent applications). Among the abovementioned external effects, the
demonstration  effect  has  prevailed  in  China,  as  statistical  tests  show  a  strong  correlation
between the increase in foreign investment and the number of low technological intensity
patents (notably industrial design patents).
Those studies show that the implementation of an IP legal framework meeting international
standards is not a sufficient factor to explain the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of
innovation in China. The implementation of the IP legal system has resulted in a parallel
increase in patent applications, which demonstrates that Chinese enterprises have integrated
the  merchant  incentive  in  their  operation.  However,  the  qualitative  analysis  shows  that
Chinese  patents  are  of  a  low  technological  level.  The  still  new  IP  legal  framework  may
explain that low tech patents, demanding fewer validation studies, are more easily granted.
But this explanation does not seem sufficient. A set of factors, including the organisation of
the  National  innovation  system  and  its  relations  with  other  innovation  systems  may  also
contribute to explain the quantitative and qualitative results of innovation.
2.2. Eviction effects and increasing costs
Today patents are criticised due to the sharp increase in their number since the end of the
1980s  and  the  parallel  enlargement  of  granting  criteria  in  some  sectors  (Gallini,  2002,
Laperche, 2004b). The increase in the number of patent applications in China has originated a
lot of litigation for patent infringement. Intellectual property in China is a « new » concept,
and imitation and copying have long been common practice (Alford, 1995). The introduction
of IP therefore needs a complete modification of behaviours. The amounts of money spent in
lawsuits and the amounts to be paid back to firms (often foreign firms) may represent a loss
for the Chinese economy. This may be at the origin of an eviction effect: in addition to being
used to develop new products, capital is used to compensate complaining enterprises.
Moreover, it is worth discussing the consequences of this legal framework on the cost of
innovation. The cost of innovation may increase as much as the number of patents granted in
China will augment. As a matter of fact, an enterprise wishing to develop a new product
would have to sign costly licencing agreements before starting the innovation process. Thus,
we may wonder which –and most of all how many – enterprises will be able to develop new
products and processes in China. It is most certain that a greater competition results in the
formation of oligopolistic market structures. This is the market’s law. But in such a vast
economy, characterized by deep inequalities between regions (which are also assessed by
patent application statistics), it seems necessary to take account of the impacts of the rapid
introduction of the market - and its corollary competition and private property – which would
perhaps require some particular policies, not closely inspired by those of industrial countries.
Finally, and in the same line, it seems interesting to study the impacts of the enlargement of
patentability  conditions  –  which  are  noticeable  in  industrial  countries-  and  of  the  global
harmonisation  of  IPR  (with  the  TRIPS  agreement)  on  developing  countries,  which  still
includes China. The extension of patentability to new subject matter (genetics, software),
linked to the clauses of  “national treatment”  and “most favoured nation”, included in TRIPS
allow multinational corporations to quite easily patent products or processes ensuing from
natural resources, or from traditional and community knowledge, transmitted from generation
to generation. These strategies, called “biopiracy” (Shiva, 2002, Mgbeoji, 2005) are seen as a
new form of colonialism. Countries like India, Brasil and Mexico are particularly concerned.
Is China preserved from these opportunist strategies? And won’t the implementation of an IP12
legal  framework,  comparable  to  the  one  of  industrial  countries,  favour  such  kind  of
practices? This issue which goes beyond the boundaries of this study is nevertheless very
important, in the perspective of the Chinese economic and industrial development.
Incentives to innovation through financial reward are one of the main arguments in favour of
the creation of a legal IP framework. In the case of China, another argument has also had a
strong  influence:  the  reinforcement  of  foreign  investment  attractiveness,  onto  which  the
growth and development policies implemented since the end of the 1970s are based. In the
following point, we investigate this relation between intellectual property and foreign direct
investment.
3. A greater confidence for foreign invesment?
3.1. Foreign investment and comparative advantages
The  formation  of  an  attractive  legal  framework  for  foreign  investment  has  induced  their
location in China, especially during the 1990s. China is now one of the major host countries
for foreign direct investment and the first one among developing countries. From 1984 to
2004, the stock of foreign direct investment in China amounted to USD 562.1 billion  with
annual inflows reaching USD 2.7 billion in 1984  and USD 60.6 billion in 2004  (see figure 3,
Bi, 2005).
Figure 3 : Investment inflows in China : 1984-2004
Source : Bi, 2005
However, some studies, focusing on the nature of investment, demonstrate that although FDI
sharply increased during the 1990s, a lot was concentrated in labour intensive manufacturing
activities, whereas investment in high tech sectors, and notably in services lagged behind
(OCDE, 2004; Dullien, 2005). Thus, according to OECD, the quantitative jump did not go
along with a qualitative one.
This  statement  according  to  which  investment  has  been  mostly  oriented  towards  banal
technologies questions us on the key factors of attractivity in China. The IP legal framework
which  meets  the  security  level  required  by  industrial  countries  did  not  go  along  with13
investment in high tech sectors. Do the businessmen of industrial countries lack trust in the
enforcement  of  IP  rules?  This  is  without  any  doubt  an  interesting  explanatory  argument,
considering the insufficient compliance with IP laws and rules stressed in all existing studies.
The figures of counterfeiting in China are high and may lead one to consider that the legal
framework is not as efficient as it seems to be on paper. Chow’s study (2003) also draws
attention on the involvement of local governants, and therefore on the role of corruption in the
fraudulent imitation of trademarks and in the dissemination of counterfeited products.
However, other factors may contribute to explain this situation, notably the characteristics of
China’s comparative advantages during the 1990s. As explained by OECD, and also by S.
Dullien for UNCTAD (2005), during the 1990s investors in China were mainly interested in
the cheap cost of labour and its quality. Thus, investment was made in assembly units that big
groups  located  in  China  to  export  their  products  to  industrial  countries  (textile,  toys,
electronics…). In 2003, as stressed by S. Dullien (2005, p.128), more than 50% of China’s
exports  were  produced  by  foreign-owned  firms  located  in  China.  This  investment  was
characterised  by  low-tech  technology  transfers.  Moreover,  high-tech  sectors  were  almost
closed to foreign investment until 2002, which is another fundamental explanation of the
weakness of high-tech foreign investment.
3.2. Towards more substantial technology transfers?
During  the  most  recent  years,  the  situation  has  seemed  to  change.  Notwithstanding  the
difficulty to know, through data, the aims of investors, it seems that the most recent investors
are more interested in the commercialisation of their products on the vast market of China.
This is reinforced by the increase in real wages and incomes in China since the end of the
1990s, as businessmen anticipated the purchasing power increase (Dullien, 2005). To spare
units, production and assembly factories focused on low labour costs were associated with
foreign affiliate companies seeking to take advantage of the market size. The opening of the
service sector to foreign investors also offered interesting opportunities to investors in the
sectors of banking and insurance.
Moreover, the most recent World Investment Report puts forward western R&D globalisation,
notably  towards  developing  countries  and  especially  China  (UNCTAD,  2005).  In  2003,
foreign affiliate firms accounted for 23.7% of Business R&D expenditures in  China (p.127).
American firms spend more and more in developing countries and among them China. R&D
expenditures  by  majority-owned  Chinese  affiliates  of  United  States  parent  companies
amounted  to  USD  7  million  in  1994  and  USD  646  million  in  2002  (p.129).  About  700
affiliates of foreign companies (not only American firms) specialised in R&D were located in
China at the end of 2004. Their R&D expenditures amounted to USD 4 billion in June 2004.
The major part of this R&D is focused on adapting products and techniques to the Chinese
market, which confirms the evolution of its attractiveness, more and more oriented towards
the advantages of its vast market. The key sectors in which multinational corporations choose
to perform R&D are technology intensive sectors, i.e. ICTs, the car-making industry, and the
pharmaceutical  industry.  We  can  thus  consider  that  this  investment  will  result  in  more
technology-intensive  technology  tranfers.  As  most  of  these  research  labs  settled  down  in
China after its accession to WTO, we can also consider that compliance with the most recent
international agreements in the field of intellectual property (notably TRIPS) has played an
important part in the location of foreign R&D labs by securing their technology transfers.14
Concluding remarks: the importance of a systemic approach
To sum up, the implementation of an IP legal framework meeting international standards is
not  a  sufficient  element  to  understand  the  innovation  dynamics  in  relation  to  foreign
investment. Other attactive factors, the cost of labour and market perspectives, also play a
prominent part. However, the recent set-up of many R&D research labs in China can be
considered as a sign of higher security for foreign investors, even if many of them are still
specialized in technological development. Even if counterfeiting exists and does not seem to
decrease, the last international agreements – such as TRIPS - may open up new prospects of
technology and knowledge transfer to China.
Investment will, as a matter of fact, increase the Chinese innovation capacity if the absorption
capacity of foreign technology exists. And the absorption capacity is closely dependent on the
innovation capacity. The definition of IP rules has resulted in low-tech patents or in new
shapes  –  product  design.  Financial  incentives  cannot  on  their  own  start  the  innovation
process. Only the building of a coherent national innovation system, linked to regional sub-
systems can give this impetus. The constitution of such systems does not automatically mean
the pure copy of western models. On the contrary, one may consider that the mere transplant
of occidental rules into China would be detrimental to the Chinese economy. For instance, the
systematic association of science and market may hinder the constitution of a strong scientific
and technical capacity in China, because of the orientation of this capacity towards short term
accumulation fields. Concurrently, a very strict implementation of intellectual property rights
may create eviction effects and increase the cost of innovation and dramatically contribute to
the  construction  or  the  accentuation  of  hierarchies  between  enterprises  and  regions.  As
stressed  by  Lundvall  and  Gu  (2006),  the  key  word  for  China  to  develop  an  efficient
innovation base is the one of institutional “learning”, based on international examples and on
its own experiences.
Concerning the analysis, our aim in this paper has been to stress the necessity for a systemic
approach of the innovation process. This means that focusing on one parameter (however
important it may be, as for instance the IP legal framework) is not sufficient to explain the
results in terms of innovation. The whole functioning of the innovation system must be taken
into  account,  including,  in  a  context  of  globalisation,  its  relations  with  other  innovation
systems. In practice, initiative and political will are definitely essential for China to transform
foreign technologies into endogenous ones and to develop its own innovation capacity. This
statement, based on the experience of other countries, leads to – and faces – other political
and geopolitical questions.15
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49.6% 7,940 0.7% 59,538   7.9%
Source:
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/gk/ndbg/2005NB/200605/P020060529505722385828.htm
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